Self-Perception Theory
Self-perception theory was introduced by Daryl J. Bem as an account of attitude formation and change grounded in observable behavior rather than privileged access to internal states (Bem, 1967, 1972). The central proposition of the theory is that individuals infer their own attitudes, emotions, and dispositions by observing their behavior and the situational context in which that behavior occurs. When internal cues are weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable, people adopt the perspective of an external observer and draw conclusions about themselves in much the same way they would infer the attitudes of others.
This framework was developed partly as an alternative interpretation of findings traditionally explained by cognitive dissonance theory. Bem argued that apparent attitude change following behavior does not necessarily require an aversive motivational state; instead, individuals may simply infer that they hold an attitude consistent with their past actions, particularly when situational incentives are insufficient to fully explain those actions (Bem, 1967). Classic demonstrations show that when individuals freely engage in a behavior under minimal external justification, they are more likely to infer a corresponding internal attitude. Conversely, when strong situational constraints or incentives are present, behavior is attributed to external causes rather than to personal preferences.
A key implication of self-perception theory is that behavior can precede and shape attitudes rather than merely express them. Experimental work on facial feedback provides a clear illustration: individuals induced to smile or frown subsequently report emotional states consistent with the observed behavior, suggesting that feelings can be inferred from bodily actions (Laird, 1974). More broadly, the theory addresses foundational questions about self-knowledge by proposing that first-person psychological attributions rely on inferential processes rather than direct introspection, especially under conditions of uncertainty (Bem, 1972).
In marketing and advertising research, self-perception theory has been widely used to explain how consumer attitudes emerge from prior consumption-related behaviors. Techniques such as the foot-in-the-door strategy rely on the idea that agreeing to a small, voluntary request leads individuals to infer a cooperative or favorable self-image, which then guides subsequent compliance (Sternthal et al., 1976). Similarly, repeated purchasing or engagement behaviors can foster favorable product attitudes as consumers interpret their actions as evidence of genuine preference.
More recent research extends these insights to digital environments. Behaviorally targeted advertising, for example, can function as an implicit cue about the self, leading consumers to infer stable interests or identities from their past online behavior. Empirical evidence shows that such ads can increase purchase likelihood by reinforcing self-inferences tied to prior actions (Summers et al., 2016). From a self-perception perspective, marketing influences attitudes most effectively when it elicits observable, freely chosen behaviors that consumers can later use as information about who they are and what they value.
References
Bem, D. J. (1967). Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena. Psychological Review, 74(3), 183–200.
Bem, D. J. (1972). Self-perception theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 6, pp. 1–62). Academic Press.
Laird, J. D. (1974). Self-attribution of emotion: The effects of expressive behavior on the quality of emotional experience. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29(4), 475–486.
Sternthal, B., Scott, C. A., & Dholakia, R. R. (1976). Self-perception as a means of personal influence: The foot-in-the-door technique. Advances in Consumer Research, 3, 387–393.
Summers, C. A., Smith, R. W., & Reczek, R. W. (2016). An audience of one: Behaviorally targeted ads as implied social labels. Journal of Consumer Research, 43(1), 156–178.